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Abstract 
 
The intent of this study is to explore organizational factors, both conceptually and operationally 
that, facilitate or inhibit a police agency from adopting intelligence-led policing. Research to date 
has yet to explore organizational factors related to intelligence-led policing among American law 
enforcement agencies. Drawing from original survey data of national law enforcement agencies 
as part of a 2009 U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice-funded project, the 
present incorporates force field analysis to explore factors of intelligence-led policing adoption 
in the United States. Findings suggest state and local agencies’ familiarity with the intelligence-
led concept and utilization of open source and received information appear to be driving 
adoption. Conversely, formal policies, lack of sufficient personnel, training, and a lack of 
intelligence-led decision making appear to be inhibiting change towards the intelligence-led 
policing paradigm. It appears agency size has minimal influence on an agency’s shift towards 
intelligence-led policing. Access to necessary resources and training appear to pose a significant 
challenge to law enforcement. Limited resources to develop an intelligence-led approach may 
result in the capability going under-developed or taking the form of other policing practices 
related to available resources – such as homeland security preparedness. This research is one of 
the first empirical explorations of intelligence-led policing adoption, especially with a national 
sample of state and local agencies.  Further conceptual clarity of the intelligence-led policing 
paradigm is provided and organizational factors are discussed.   
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Intelligence-Led Policing and Forces of Organizational Change in the United States 
 
 
Introduction 
 Law enforcement currently finds itself in the midst of a philosophical shift in practice.  
Intelligence-led policing has emerged as a new policing paradigm (Crank, Kadleck, and Koski, 
2010; Schaible and Sheffield, 2012).  This philosophy is intended to meet the demands of an 
increasingly complex environment for American law enforcement post-September 11, 2001 
(hereafter 9/11).  Just as community policing faced implementation challenges when it was 
developed in the mid-1980s, intelligence-led policing will undoubtedly experience the same.  
However, the literature on intelligence-led policing is sparse at best as it lacks a clear 
understanding of how this new philosophy should be conceptualized as well as any evidence-
based insights with respect to law enforcement’s movement towards this emerging philosophy.  
The intent of this study is to explore organizational factors - both conceptually and operationally 
that - facilitate or inhibit a police agency from implementing intelligence-led policing.  Drawing 
from original survey data of national law enforcement agencies as part of a National Institute of 
Justice-funded project, the present study seeks to remedy this research shortcoming by providing 
further conceptual clarity as to what an intelligence-led policing program should be and what 
organizational factors appear to be influencing its adoption.   
 
Intelligence-Led Policing 
In an effort to gain understanding of this new philosophy, intelligence-led policing has 
been compared and contrasted with recent police innovations such as community policing 
(Carter and Carter, 2009a), comparative statistics (CompStat), and problem-oriented policing 
(McGarrell, Freilich and Chermak, 2007; Ratcliffe, 2008).  Though these policing paradigms 
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share commonalities with intelligence-led policing, such as a reliance on two-way information 
flow between the police and public, a specificity of crimes and problems rather than a general 
approach, and the use of data to inform evidence-based decision making, there are unique 
characteristics of intelligence-led policing which require a shift in organizational philosophy and 
practice.  Rather than simply being an information clearinghouse that has been appended to the 
organization, intelligence-led policing provides strategic integration of intelligence analysis into 
the overall mission of the organization (Carter and Carter, 2009a).  Ratcliffe (2008) echoes this 
approach as he envisions intelligence-led policing as involving a comprehensive re-adjustment of 
organizational functions deriving from the intelligence capacity.  Ratcliffe (2008) goes on to note 
organizational characteristics which should diverge from traditional practices for an agency to 
implement intelligence-led policing.  These characteristics include intelligence-specific training, 
communication of intelligence across all aspects of the organization, and the utilization of 
intelligence for strategic, tactical, and operational decision making – an aspect that is only 
achievable if the intelligence is actionable (Carter and Carter, 2009a).  
  Much of the literature related to the emergence of intelligence-led policing falls within 
the homeland security arena.  Authors typically merge the two concepts, taking the position that 
intelligence-led policing is either a component of the homeland security function to enhance 
post-9/11 policing (Carter and Carter, 2009b; Oliver, 2006, 2009) or driven by homeland security 
as a result of funding incentives (Schafer, Burruss and Giblin, 2009; Schaible and Sheffield, 
2012).  Such positions are correct, but this is true for many facets of law enforcement and 
homeland security responsibilities as tasked by the federal government.  As such, it is more 
appropriate to focus on literature and recommendations specific to intelligence-led policing to 
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provide clarity as to what this new philosophy is and why law enforcement is migrating towards 
the concept.   
 
History and Emergence 
The intelligence-led policing philosophy has grown from its roots in the United Kingdom 
where it takes the form of the National Intelligence Model (NIM).  While some scholars have 
promoted the idea of applying the NIM to American policing (Baker, 2009; Ratcliffe, 2008), this 
approach is not so simple.  The smallest of Britain’s 43 constabularies has approximately 900 
sworn constables who police large geographic areas with both urban and rural characteristics.  
The majority of these agencies employ 1,200 to 1,600 sworn personnel (Carter and Carter, 
2009a).  While not a national police force, there are national standards that apply to all of the 
agencies for training, promotion, operations, and salary (Bayley, 1992).  Given the size of these 
police forces and their budgets, all have the resources to hire analysts and the flexibility to 
reassign personnel to operate an intelligence-led philosophy.  Crescenzo (2007) echoed this 
sentiment in a qualitative study with intelligence professionals in the U.K. and U.S. - noting 
specifically the inability of the NIM to be successfully implemented in the U.S. without uniform 
standards across all levels of law enforcement.   
When compared to the British police structure, the majority of approximately 17,985 U.S. 
law enforcement agencies (Reaves, 2011), many of which have fewer than ten sworn officers, 
have varied policing standards between and within states.  The budgets of most of these agencies 
are small compared to those in the U.K. and typically come from local funds supplemented by 
short-term federal grants.  New policing philosophies, emerging initiatives, and federal standards 
and recommendations are largely unenforceable unless explicitly stated in special conditions of a 
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grant.  Though best practices can be gleaned from the NIM and applied to policing in the U.S., 
given the fragmented and diverse nature of American law enforcement, the philosophy of 
intelligence-led policing is much different in the United States.  Moreover, intelligence-led 
policing dramatically shifted from a “tips and leads” policing practice in the U.S. prior to 
September 11, 2001, to a philosophy focused on the prevention and mitigation of threats and 
crimes through active information sharing and analysis.  The focus of the research presented here 
is on intelligence-led policing as it is conceptualized and practiced in the U.S. – not in the United 
Kingdom.   
The key difference between ILP as utilized in the U.S. versus the U.K. is a focus on the 
collection of raw information and proactive information sharing among a variety of law 
enforcement agencies (Carter and Gore, 2013; Schaible and Sheffield, 2012), other government 
organizations (e.g., public health), and the private sector within the U.S. model (Carter and 
Carter, 2009).  The U.S. emphasis is truly on the sharing of information related to possible 
threats and the creation of actionable intelligence products as a result of this proactive effort 
which can prevent or mitigate threats.  The U.K. model of ILP, as fashioned from the National 
Intelligence Model, is focused on generating and analyzing situational crime and habitual 
offender data to make more informed decisions regarding police resources and targeting specific 
crime problems (Ratcliffe, 2008).   
In March 2002, more than 120 criminal intelligence experts from across the U.S. gathered 
for an “Intelligence Summit” funded by the Office of Community-Oriented Policing Services 
and hosted by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (International Association of 
Chiefs of Police, 2002).  At this summit, law enforcement professionals expressed frustration in 
the lack of guidance from the government as to how intelligence-led policing should be defined 
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and put into practice.  Specifically, one of the core recommendations was to “promote 
intelligence-led policing through a common understanding of criminal intelligence and its 
usefulness” (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2002, p. v).  Ratcliffe (2005) 
reaffirmed this frustration among police practitioners in New Zealand that while very excited 
about the potential benefits of the intelligence-led philosophy, found it difficult to adopt as a 
result of a lack of consistent understanding with respect to the new concept.  As a result, the 
Global Intelligence Working Group was created and their first product was the National Criminal 
Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP) that stated “all agencies, regardless of size, must have a 
minimal criminal intelligence sharing capability” (Global Intelligence Working Group, 2003, p. 
iii).   While there is no universally accepted definition of intelligence-led policing, the following 
definition perhaps best illustrates the conceptualization of the philosophy: 
The collection and analysis of information related to crime and conditions that contribute 
to crime, resulting in an actionable intelligence product intended to aid law enforcement 
in developing tactical responses to threats and/or strategic planning related to emerging or 
changing threats (Carter and Carter, 2009a, p. 317).  
Attempts to practice intelligence-led policing are as ambiguous as attempts to define the 
philosophy.  Similar to community policing, different agencies practice intelligence-led policing 
in a manner consistent with their agency’s mission and community needs - largely a result of 
such a wide variance with respect to the needs and priorities of fragmented American law 
enforcement agencies.  For example, many agencies are likely to interpret CompStat or hotspot 
policing as their intelligence-led policing practice.  With minimal guidance and an increased 
demand for intelligence-led policing, there are likely to be agencies that refer to themselves as 
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“intelligence-led”, but lack the functional capabilities to actually operate an intelligence-led 
approach.   
As law enforcement personnel grapple with understanding ILP, many have suggested that 
it is the same as CompStat (Wood and Shearing, 2007).  There are important similarities that will 
help in the adoption of ILP, yet there are also important substantive differences that must be 
similarly recognized.  Intelligence-led policing is concerned with “all crimes and all threats”, not 
just terrorism and the nature of crime that ILP focuses on is typically multijurisdictional and 
often complex criminality, such as criminal enterprises and established street gangs. 
The value of CompStat is the identification of a crime series or serious crime within a 
jurisdiction (e.g., “hot spots”), based on a timely analysis of incident reports.  The analysis of 
data captured via crime reporting can provide important information - such as geographical 
parameters and modus operandi - that can be used to forecast a crime series in the immediate 
future, aid in problem-solving and provide descriptive information, such as behaviors, targets, 
and criminal instruments that operational units may use to apprehend perpetrators, disrupt 
criminal activity, or alter crime generating environments (McDonald, 2002). 
Conversely, ILP focuses on threats rather than crimes that have occurred.  The threat 
information may be derived from suspicious activity reports (SARs) or a tip submitted by 
community or business members.  Rather than analyze information and evidence derived from 
incident reports (e.g., an event that occurred in the past), ILP relies on the identification of threat 
factors that are contributing to the threat’s evolution (Carter and Carter, 2012).  Similarly, to be 
effective, both community policing and ILP require feedback on analyzed information to be 
consistently informed of potential problems or threats that may be encountered during the course 
of their shift (Carter, 2009). 
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While the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan states all agencies, regardless of 
size, must have an intelligence-led policing capability, there is no common denominator as to 
what an intelligence-led policing capability constitutes for agencies of different size and 
responsibility.  Intuition would assert that a larger police agency should have a more 
comprehensive intelligence capacity than a smaller agency.  While this is an appropriate 
assumption, it is not appropriate to automatically consider a small police agency’s “basic” 
intelligence-led capability as being insufficient.  An agency’s intelligence-led policing capability 
need only be as advanced as the responsibilities that agency requires. The New York Police 
Department will have a significantly different intelligence-led policing capability than that of a 
rural department with less than five sworn officers.   
While this is a crude example, it serves to point out the fundamental difference.  Rather 
than being fixated on the label “intelligence-led policing”, practitioners and academics alike need 
to be concerned with identifying an appropriate level of intelligence practices that allow an 
agency to fulfill its role in the greater law enforcement intelligence landscape.  For example, a 
small rural agency will not need to employ a full-time intelligence analyst and does not require 
connectivity to the most sophisticated information sharing systems – they simply need to be 
aware of intelligence practices, have a process in place to send and receive information, and be 
able to identify and collect information consistent with the collection requirements identified in 
their jurisdiction.  The difficulty for interpreting levels of adoption is that academics and 
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practitioners both struggle to identify characteristics of an appropriate intelligence-led policing 
function for an agency regardless of the agency’s size and responsibility characteristics.   
Regardless of the size of state or local law enforcement agencies attempting to engage in 
intelligence-led policing, all agencies have access to state fusion centers to either enhance or 
provide an analytic function (Carter and Carter, 2009b) which can yield desired actionable 
intelligence products.  There are currently 77 official fusion centers in the U.S. (Carter, 
Chermak, McGarrell, Carter and Drew, 2012) to increase the exchange of information and data 
across government and private sectors to enhance law enforcement’s ability to fight crime and 
terrorism and prevent threats (Global Intelligence Working Group, 2005; McGarrell et al., 2007).  
The relationship between intelligence-led policing and fusion centers is reinforced by the Office 
of Homeland Security’s National Strategy for Homeland Security that identifies the philosophy 
as one of the primary tools to combat terrorism and threats to the U.S (Homeland Security 
Council, 2007).  Fusion centers increase the production and sharing of crime and intelligence 
analysis products.  Manning (2001) suggested that crime analysis is a step in the right direction 
for policing, but that it lacks the actual analytic component to inform decision making – 
intelligence-led policing serves as the vehicle by which informed decision making can result 
from the utilization of analytic products.   
Ratcliffe (2008) went on to note that intelligence-led policing is a new tactic relying on 
crime analysis that can rapidly improve police processes and management.  Lastly, academics 
(Carter and Carter, 2009a; Ratcliffe, 2008; Ratcliffe and Guidetti, 2008; Scheider, Chapman and 
Schapiro, 2009) and practitioners (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2005; Fuentes, 2006; Guidetti 
and Martinelli, 2009) alike agree that intelligence-led policing is not only new to policing, but so 
new in fact that it requires a shift in police management, organizational  structure, and even day-
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to-day operations.  Furthermore, Scheider and his colleagues (2009) specifically identified 
intelligence-led policing as an innovation and that while it is new to law enforcement, the lessons 
learned from previous policing innovations are critical to its successful adoption.    
 Relying on available literature specific to intelligence-led policing to help inform the 
organizational change process is difficult as this knowledgebase currently remains in its infancy.  
Academics and professionals have shared the workload in producing the few available works, 
although a consistent understanding and conceptualization is lacking.  This is not to discount the 
works authors have done to this point as a great deal of progress has occurred.  Current 
conceptual works specific to intelligence-led policing have generally focused on the role of 
intelligence analysts (Cope, 2004), intelligence and crime analysis (Ratcliffe, 2008), counter-
terrorism (Carter and Carter, 2012; McGarrell et al., 2007), police management (Ratcliffe, 2005, 
2008; Ratcliffe and Guidetti, 2008), and operational concepts (Carter and Carter, 2009a).  
However, from an empirical standpoint, there has been little advancement as the only empirical 
studies in the United States at the time of this study have come from either a cross-jurisdictional 
collaborative perspective (Schaible and Sheffield, 2012) or most commonly a fusion center 
perspective  (Forsyth, 2005; Graphia-Joyal, 2010; Nenneman, 2008; Ratcliffe and Walden, 2010; 
Saari, 2010; Simeone, 2007).   
As mentioned, the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP) was created by 
the Global Intelligence Working Group to provide law enforcement agencies with the necessary 
resources to develop, gather, access, receive, and share intelligence.  To this end, the plan 
established a number of national standards that have been formally recognized by the 
professional law enforcement community as the proper role and processes for the contemporary 
application of law enforcement intelligence (Carter, 2009).  The NCISP had a significant 
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influence on shifting organizational policies and procedures – even in some cases physical 
realignment of units within the agency (Ratcliffe and Guidetti, 2008).  Within the NCISP was the 
formal call for American law enforcement agencies to adopt intelligence-led policing.  However, 
this recommendation lacked guidance for adopting this new philosophy and evaluating progress 
– thus inhibiting researchers from exploring, and practitioners from implementing, the 
intelligence-led policing philosophy.  A successful intelligence-led philosophy can be 
determined through the effectiveness of state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies’ ability 
to collect, analyze, disseminate, and integrate intelligence into the operations of the organization.  
 Intelligence-led policing is envisioned as a tool for information sharing both within and 
across law enforcement agencies (Carter and Carter, 2009a).  The concept aids law enforcement 
agencies in identifying threats and developing responses to prevent those threats from reaching 
fruition in America’s communities (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2002).  A 
challenge exists in that there are differing views of the intelligence-led policing concept and its 
application yet there remains a movement toward the adoption of intelligence-led policing 
without a universally accepted definition or operational philosophy (Bureau of Justice 
Assistance, 2009).  Intelligence-led policing, like community policing, must be tailored to the 
characteristics of each individual agency.  As such, the approach must be created through an 
inclusive development process that ensures it is in concert with an agency’s goals and functions, 
its capabilities, and the characteristics of both the agency and the jurisdiction it serves.  
Throughout the history of change within police, a variety of organizational factors have either 
facilitated or inhibited philosophical movement (Weisburd, Uchida and Green, 1993; Willis, 
Mastrofski and Weisburd, 2007).   
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Organizational Characteristics and Police Change   
Community policing has developed skills among law enforcement personnel that directly 
supports ILP:  Problem solving, environmental scanning, effective communications with the 
public, fear reduction, and community mobilization to deal with problems are among the 
important attributes community policing brings to this challenge (Carter and Carter, 2009).  It 
was specifically noted within the NCISP that:  
Over the past decade, simultaneous to federally led initiatives to improve intelligence 
gathering, thousands of community-policing officers have been building close and 
productive relationships with the citizens they serve. The benefits of these relationships 
are directly related to information and intelligence sharing: COP officers have immediate 
and unfettered access to local, neighborhood information as it develops. Citizens are 
aware of, and seek out COP officers to provide them with new information that may be 
useful to criminal interdiction or long-term problem solving. The positive nature of 
COP/citizen relationships promotes a continuous and reliable transfer of information 
from one to the other. It is time to maximize the potential for community-policing efforts 
to serve as a gateway of locally based information to prevent terrorism, and all other 
crimes (Global Intelligence Working Group, 2003, p.4). 
 
As one component of its philosophy, ILP employs community policing principles, 
building on tactics and methodologies developed during years of community policing adoption.  
From an information management perspective, community policing utilizes information gained 
from citizens to help define the parameters of community problems while ILP relies on 
information input as the essential ingredient for intelligence analysis.  Two-way communication 
with the public is essential for community policing since information is sought from the public 
about offenders while disseminating critical information to the public aids in crime prevention 
and fear reduction (Carter and Carter, 2009).  Within the context of ILP, communications from 
the public can provide valuable information for the intelligence process.  Like community 
policing, ILP requires an investment of effort by all components of the organization as well as 
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the community (Maguire, 1997).  Based on the precepts of the ILP philosophy and the standards 
of the NCISP, law enforcement intelligence is an organization-wide responsibility that relies on a 
symbiotic relationship with residents. 
Given these similarities, it is useful to draw upon the litany of research which has 
examined the adoption of community policing.  Many scholars account for the influence of 
organizational characteristics such as structure and context (King, 1999, 2000; Maguire, Kuhns, 
Uchida, and Cox, 1997; Maguire, Shin, Zhao, and Hassell, 2003; Zhao, 1996) while others have 
concentrated on agencies as a whole and both the internal and external influences of adoption 
(Moore, Sparrow and Spelman, 1997; Oliver, 2000; Skolnick and Bayley, 1986; Weisburd et al., 
1993).  Consistent with this literature, organizational structure is examined in terms of 
complexity and control.  Research has found significant relationships between organizational 
structure and community policing (Katz, 2001; Maguire, 1997, 2003; Zhao, 1996) with the 
exception of Wilson (2006) who did not – a finding he concluded to be striking.  Complexity is 
determined by the extent organizations have variance in their employees and capabilities.  
Control is typically achieved through formal policies and procedures.  With respect to the 
context of organizations, the size, regional location, and number of responsibilities of an agency 
have been found to influence adoption (King, 1999; Maguire et al., 1997; Maguire et al., 2003, 
Wilson, 2006; Zhao, 1996).  Furthermore, commitment to, and training on, the desired 
innovation have been found to facilitate adoption (Morabito, 2010; Yates and Pillai, 1996).   
 Langworthy (1986) discussed the notion of differentiation across occupational specialties 
for accomplishing agency tasks within units which require specialized knowledge and training.  
This notion is supported in policing by Greene’s (2000) finding that police agencies having a 
community relations unit would be more successful in community policing implementation as 
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well as research on gang units within police departments and effectiveness of combatting gang 
problems (Katz, 2001).  Consistent with this perspective is the presence of intelligence personnel 
within police departments.  Not only are these personnel responsible for handling the intelligence 
function within the police department, they are tasked with additional responsibilities unique to 
the intelligence-led philosophy – such as the development of public-private partnerships and 
operational relationships with fusion centers.  As with other changes in policing philosophies, 
having dedicated personnel for the intelligence function, or at a minimum a sufficient number of 
personnel to handle intelligence-related tasks, is likely to facilitate change towards intelligence-
led policing (Phillips, 2012).   
 The influence of organizational size on implementing change remains debatable.  Wilson 
(2006) and King (2000) found size to have no effect on community policing implementation 
whereas Maguire and his colleagues (1997) and Zhao (1996) found a positive association 
between the two.  Schafer and his colleagues (2009) found large agencies (100 or more sworn 
officers) and small agencies (10 or less sworn officers) located in a close proximity to 
metropolitan areas are more likely to adopt homeland security innovations.  With respect to both 
community policing and homeland security, Lee (2010) found that smaller agencies are more 
likely to assign community policing and homeland security tasks to the same officers, thus 
integrating the two out of resource necessity.  The uniqueness of intelligence-led policing is that 
unlike previous policing paradigms, all agencies regardless of size have been changed to adopt a 
minimum intelligence capacity (Global Intelligence Working Group, 2003).   
In an effort to facilitate successful implementation, commitment has been shown to be a 
significant construct of successful change towards community policing (Morabito, 2010; Yates 
and Pillai, 1996).  Ford and his colleagues (2003) found commitment to be positively associated 
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with community-policing operations, a tenet outlined as a philosophical “must have” for 
successful community policing implementation (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1994).  Moore 
and Stephens (1991) refer to chiefs of community policing agencies as “executives” in that they 
are aware of strategic management that will allow for the successful integration of necessary 
philosophies to meet the needs of their environment.  The necessity of commitment from the 
chief executive for successful intelligence-led policing implementation has been acknowledged 
in research (Carter and Carter, 2009a; Ratcliffe, 2008) and professional publications (Bureau of 
Justice Assistance, 2009; Global Intelligence Working Group, 2003).   
Training provides a critical opportunity to communicate understanding of new policy and 
procedural changes.  Chief executives often have a more comprehensive understanding of 
intelligence-led policing as compared to line level officers (Cope, 2004; Carter, 2009).  This lack 
of understanding among line level officers can be attributed to resistance to “new” policing 
methods (Ratcliffe, 2008) or poor perceptions of outputs on behalf of sworn officers and civilian 
analysts (Cope, 2004).  Morabito (2010) found a positive relationship between training and 
community policing adoption while Schafer and his colleagues (2009) found a positive 
relationship between training and local law enforcement agencies in Illinois that are adopting 
homeland security preparedness.  Despite a recognized demand for training on intelligence-led 
policing (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2009), there is little supply.  While training focused on 
community policing is widely accepted, a study in South Carolina indicated 99% of state and 
local police academies have courses designed for community policing operations while only 11% 
have courses designed to encompass issues most commonly associated with intelligence, such as 
terrorism and homeland security – a finding believed to be consistent nationwide (Rojek, 
Kaminski, Smith and Scheer, 2007).   
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Current Study 
The current study seeks to explore conceptual and operational characteristics of police 
organizations as they shift towards an intelligence-led policing philosophy.  Research on this 
emerging police philosophy is sparse and lacks empirical insights as to what factors facilitate or 
inhibit change.  The current study remedies this shortcoming by exploring a national sample of 
state and local law enforcement agencies and the factors which drive or restrain the desired 
change.  Further conceptual clarity is provided on intelligence-led policing, explorative findings 
are presented, and implications for policy and practice are discussed.   
 
Data and Methods 
Data 
Data were gleaned from a larger project funded by the National Institute of Justice2 
which conducted a national survey of law enforcement intelligence practices of different key 
personnel.  The survey sample consisted of state and local law enforcement officers and other 
individuals charged with building an intelligence capacity for individual agencies.  Given the 
infancy of the intelligence-led policing concept, it is critical to target key personnel working 
within the intelligence capability of a police department to increase the likelihood of valid 
responses.  This approach has been utilized in police research focused on specialty personnel 
when examining issues such as police assigned to cybercrime (Bossler and Holt, 2012), policing 
the mentally ill (Borum, Deane, Steadman and Morrissey, 1998) and policing sex workers 
(Simic, Johnston, Platt, Baros, Andjelkovic, Novotny and Rhodes, 2006).   
 
                                                 
2 Grant number 2008-IJ-CX-0007. National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice. 
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Survey of Key Personnel 
In order to obtain insights into intelligence practice of local law enforcement agencies, a 
web-designed survey was distributed to law enforcement personnel across the United States.  
More specifically, these persons were individuals who had attended a national law enforcement 
intelligence training program funded by the Department of Homeland Security.  Individuals 
selected to attend this training program were typically selected by their agency to lead the efforts 
to develop or re-engineer their agency’s intelligence capacity.  This sampling strategy, which 
includes personnel from significantly different sized police agencies in all geographic regions of 
the country, was chosen for three reasons.  First, in attending this training, these officers were 
identified by their respective agency as a representative of the intelligence function within the 
agency.  Second, as a result of their selection on behalf of their agency, this sample includes law 
enforcement personnel who have a working understanding of key issues related to intelligence-
led policing, and thus will be able to address specifically the factors associated with the change 
process.  Third, their awareness of the contemporary intelligence structures, requirements, and 
formal communication networks increases the likelihood that they will have direct knowledge 
about the extent to which their agency has adopted this new philosophy.   
A group of state, local, and tribal law enforcement intelligence leaders served as subject 
matter experts and scrutinized preliminary survey drafts.  A separate group of law enforcement 
officials then took part in a pretest of the survey to identify ambiguous or poorly worded 
questions, issues that were overlooked, and items that could be potentially difficult to answer 
correctly.  In general, the survey captured respondents’ intelligence experiences and issues 
related to intelligence-led policing.  The survey was administered using a web-based software 
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program.  In early June 2009 an e-mail was sent to each addressee outlining the purpose of the 
study and inviting them to complete a self-administered online questionnaire.  Formal refusals to 
participate and automated server notifications explaining the source addresses were no longer 
valid were removed.   
The sampling frame was then corrected by removing individuals who could not be 
contacted or who declined to participate.  Invitation e-mails were sent to a sample of 967 to 
participate in the survey study.  Further follow-up e-mails were issued a second, third, and fourth 
time at approximately monthly intervals; the fifth and final reminders were sent at the end of 
March 2010 and the collection window closed a month later.  A total of 272 state, local, and 
tribal law enforcement agencies are included in the sample3.  It should be noted that the sample 
for the present study is comprised of personnel drawn from only state, local, and tribal law 
enforcement agencies.  Initial responses were received from a variety of federal law 
enforcement, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration, 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, Transportation Security Administration, and 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement.  These responses were removed from the sample.  
Though these agencies play a significant role in law enforcement intelligence (especially national 
security intelligence), the present study is focused on practices at the state and local levels – thus 
federal agencies were not appropriate for comparison.  Regional information sharing centers4 
were also removed from the sample as they are intelligence-mission specific and are not 
representative of state or local law enforcement.   
                                                 
3 A complex survey design function was utilised within STATA statistical software to adjust standard errors and 
account for multiple responses from individuals from the same agency.  
4 Regional information system (RISS) centers that responded included: Middle Atlantic-Great Lakes Organised 
Crime Law Enforcement Network (MAGLOCLEN), Mid-States Organised Crime Information Center (MOCIC), 
and the Regional Organised Crime Information Center (ROCIC).   
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The response rate for the present study is 28% (n= 272 / 967).  Such a response rate is not 
surprising given online-based surveys yield lower response rates than do traditional mail or in-
person surveys (Shih and Fan, 2009), that cross-sectional response rates in social sciences are 
declining (Brick and Williams, 2013), and the exploratory nature of the research within an area 
of law enforcement commonly believed to be a difficult one to sample (Chermak et al., 2013; 
Graphia-Joyal, 2012).  Though this response rate is lower than one would hope, we believe the 
sample is valid.  The sample includes agencies from small, medium, and large municipalities, 
county sheriffs, and state police.  Furthermore, 41 states (including the District of Columbia) 
with geographic distribution across the five regions of the U.S. are represented in the sample.   
In an effort to learn why the response rate was not higher, follow-up telephone interviews 
were conducted with 100 randomly selected participants from the sample.  Among the key 
reasons that were consistently reported for not responding were: 
Job responsibilities.  A number of individuals stated that they had been reassigned or 
promoted and no longer worked in the intelligence function.  As a result they either felt 
the survey no longer applied to them or they were not familiar with current activities in 
the intelligence function. 
The survey length.  In order to fully explore the nature of and challenges to law 
enforcement intelligence work, the survey asked respondents more than 100 questions.  
Feedback suggests individuals were uncomfortable committing to this task, especially 
when they were at work.  As one informant remarked, “Thirty minutes is too long, there’s 
no way I have time to take a survey for half an hour – we’re under massive pressure as it 
is.” 
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Security.  A handful of individuals were concerned about the security implications of 
sharing information about intelligence activities outside of the law enforcement 
community.   
Despite the low response rate, the present study provides unique value because there has 
been so little research on intelligence-led policing, especially at the national-level.  As a result 
this study provides one of the first empirical insights into the factors associated with 
organizational change towards an intelligence-led policing philosophy.  Table 1 displays 
descriptive information for the agencies represented in the current study.  The median agency 
size is 276 total sworn and non-sworn personnel while the majority of agencies were located in 
the Midwest region of the United States, followed closely by the Southeast and Northwest.  
Respondents are mostly investigators and administrators who have been employed by their 
agency for more than 15 years. Appendix A provides a list of the survey items and coded 
responses for variables categorized as either “driving” or “restraining” forces in the analysis.  
 
[ Table 1 approximately here ] 
 
Force Field Analysis 
When there is intent to change parts of an organization, whether by enacting innovative 
programs or shifting the institutional thinking, organizational inertia and threats to the traditional 
organizational framework can result in resistance to that change (Lee, 2010).  During the 
research and planning stages of any intended change it is imperative that an organization identify 
forces that can contribute to smooth implementation of the change, and those forces that may 
resist the change.  In 1951 Kurt Lewin advanced force field analysis as a model “for 
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understanding a problematic situation and planned corrective actions” (French and Bell, 1995, p. 
101).  Force field analysis has several components.  First, an organization balances opposing 
forces in a state of quasi-stable “equilibrium.”  Second, driving forces push an organization 
toward change; restraining forces resist change.  Third, equilibrium ensures stability in 
organization and member behavior and productivity.  Finally, if an organization wants to change 
it must move the balancing point to a new position.  Successful change requires and organization 
to increase the driving forces while reducing or minimizing the restraining forces.  Lewin 
stressed that both sides of an equilibrium point must be understood to successfully move the 
equilibrium point to a new state. 
 There are four-steps in a force field analysis to identify the driving and resisting forces.  
First, specify the current condition and why it must be changed.  Second, define the desired 
condition or goal of successful change.  Third, determine the driving and restraining forces in the 
current state of equilibrium.  Fourth, measure the intensity of the driving and restraining forces to 
determine which forces are strong, weak, and controllable (French and Bell, 1995).  When a 
driving force is determined to be strong it should be maximized to move toward the desired 
equilibrium state.  Conversely, if a restraining force is weak, this too should be exploited to 
move to the desired state.  If a restraining force is strong, attempts should be made to minimize 
its influence, if possible.  Finally, driving and restraining forces that are not particularly strong or 
weak may be ignored if they are of little assistance in the change process.   
An advantage in using Force Field analysis is that it is fairly easy to use and understand.  
Further, a researcher can be creative when identifying potential driving and resisting forces.  A 
disadvantage is that identifying driving and restraining forces is not an easy task (Pippard and 
Bjorklund, 2003).  Force field analysis has been used to examine a variety of organizational  
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fields, including changes in health care programs (Baulcomb, 2003), social work organization 
(Bragal, 2000), mental-health care (Grant, 2001), educational program (Lifter, Kruger, Okun, 
Tabol, Poklop, and Shishmanian, 2005), the forces impacting the decision-making of social 
problems (Pippard and Bjorklund, 2003), and the driving and restraining forces in cognitive 
activity (Kruglanski, Belanger, Chen, Kopetz, Pierro, and Mannetti, 2012).   
 
Current State, Desired State, and Driving and Restraining Forces 
It is suggested that the current state of quasi-stable equilibrium for policing is “tradition” 
because most police agencies maintain a response-based policing strategy (Dabney, 2010; 
Weisburd, Mastrofski, McNally, Greenspan, and Willis, 2003).  Policing innovations, such as 
community policing and CompStat, include an expanded use of information analysis to improve 
crime reduction strategies (Ratcliffe, 2007; Rickman, Stewart and Dimitrov, 2012).  Thus, the 
desired equilibrium state of policing is proposed to be an adoption of ILP strategies (i.e., analysis 
and the use of intelligence products).   
This study identified a variety of driving and restraining forces.  From a conceptual 
perspective, police agency may have some exposure to ILP without actually using the approach.  
Understanding respondent’s views of ILP, prior to its actual application in policing, are 
important.  Their exposure to the notion of ILP can shape the strength of driving and restraining 
forces because the respondents do not have first-hand experience with the new approach.  Thus, 
several forces examined a respondent’s, or the agencies, awareness of ILP.  Respondents were 
asked “How familiar are you with the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan.”  Familiarity 
with the NCISP is considered a driving force; awareness of the plan would indicate extended - 
understanding of ILP.  A high score on this item would be a strong driver toward ILP.  A second 
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item asked “How familiar are you with the intelligence-led policing concept?”  Because 
respondents are experienced investigators or police administrators, and they can model behavior 
for the entire agency (Jones, Moulton, and Reynolds, 2010), this items is considered a driving 
force.  If the mean score of this item tilts toward “very familiar” this would suggest this is a 
strong driving force.  A third item asked “The chief executive of your agency supports 
intelligence-led policing?”  This is considered a driving force because administrative support is 
important to the acceptance of a new policy (Bayley, 1994; Greene, Bergman and McLaughlin, 
1994) and has been found to facilitate change towards community policing (Morabito, 2010).  
Two items assessed overall agency familiarity with ILP: “Most of the intelligence analysts in my 
agency are familiar with the intelligence-led policing concept” and “Most personnel (beyond 
analysts) in my agency are familiar with the intelligence-led policing concept.”  Both items are 
considered driving forces toward change because the phrasing of the items suggests that ILP is 
already used.  Thus, if the mean scores tilt toward “agree” these are strong drivers for moving the 
rest of the agency toward ILP. 
Several conceptual level measures are considered restraining forces in the current 
analysis of ILP.  “Our agency has an intelligence capacity mission statement” is considered a 
restraining force because a formal written policy is time consuming and requires substantial 
effort on the part of the administration.  This would be particularly true when a new policy for a 
new (possibly complex) analytic approach that is somewhat contrary to the traditional “real 
police work” approach.  Thus, if the score tilts toward “disagree” this would be a strong 
restraining force because it indicates a lack of formal support from the administration.  Another 
item asked “Legal counsel has reviewed and approved all policies and procedures of the 
intelligence capacity.”  ILP might normally be resisted as “too big” or “not real police work” and 
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would be supported with legal legitimacy.  Without it, resistance may actually gain legitimacy.  
Thus, if the mean scores tilt toward “agree” this would be a strong restraining force.  Finally, the 
item “All analysts (or personnel responsible for the intelligence function) in your agency are 
required to receive specific training in intelligence-led policing” is considered a restraining force 
because the effort needed to develop or cultivate a training program may be a burden on the 
agency.  It would be easier for an agency to simply enact an ILP program.  Thus, if the mean 
score tilts toward “disagree” this would indicate a strong restraining force. 
The second classification for selecting forces was operational, indicating that police 
agencies actually employ ILP functions within the department.  The process of changing aspects 
of an organization to reflect a new paradigm requires effort on behalf of the organization’s 
personnel.  While an agency may be committed to ILP, the development of formal policies and 
procedures to make this new paradigm operational require an output of manpower and/or 
resources to complete.  Scholars have acknowledged the difficulties of overcoming this 
application of effort towards change, noting that the potential for change in policing is resisted 
by “a comfortable past” (Buerger, 2010, p. 92) – the notion of organizational inertia prohibiting 
new policies and procedures to either replace or parallel those already in existence.  Furthermore, 
organizations have standard problems and solutions already developed that organizational 
personnel believe can be applied to emerging changes and creates a culture where new 
organizational components are difficult to create.  As such, ILP may appear attractive and 
commitment to the philosophy may exist, but it is not a solution with any organizational 
precedent of use since it continues to emerge within practice and research – thus it requires 
significant effort to get a new policing practice accepted by police personnel (Stojkovic, Kalinich 
and Klofas, 2008).  
25 
 
 
 
The item “Does your agency’s intelligence function follow the National Criminal 
Intelligence Sharing Plan Recommendations” is a driving force because following 
recommendations would indicate the agency is moving toward a formal ILP program.  Another 
item, “Does your agency have a specific ‘Suspicious Activity Reporting’ (SAR) policy?” is a 
driving force because, if it is assumed these already exist in an agency, they could be emphasized 
as an easy source of data for ILP.  “We have a sufficient number of staff to achieve our agency’s 
intelligence capacity mission” is a driving force because the item is phrased in a way suggesting 
the agency already employ the needed personal for ILP; this would be less likely to result in 
expending extra effort to hire and train an analyst.  If the mean score tilts toward “disagree” this 
would indicate a weak driver (but not necessarily a strong restraining force).  Respondents were 
asked “Is your Criminal Intelligence Record System 28 Code of Federal Regulation Part 23 
compliant?” is a driving force because this item indicates movement toward a formal ILP 
program.  If the score tilts toward “yes” it would be a strong driving force toward adoption of 
ILP.  The item “How often is intelligence formally integrated into your agency’s decision-
making process” is a driving force because this item implies intelligence is used already.  The 
phrasing of the item has a positive connotation.  Thus, if the responses tilt toward the use of 
intelligence in decision-making then this is a strong driver if ILP as a more formal part of the 
organizations move toward ILP.   
The item “Our agency uses information from open sources as part of the intelligence 
process” is considered a driving force.  Open sources are free and easy to use (some agencies 
have used social media to track people).  It may be that agencies “experiment” with open 
sources.  Thus, of the mean score tilts toward agree, this could be a driving force toward 
accepting ILP.  Respondents were asked “How close is the working relationship between your 
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organization and your State Fusion Center?”  This item is considered a driving force because if a 
link exists it shows an established relationship and growth in an agency’s ILP efforts.  Thus, a tilt 
toward a “close” relationship is a strong driver toward the institutionalization of ILP.  Finally, 
the item “How frequently does intelligence from your agency contribute to arrests?” is a driving 
force. The item is phrased in a way suggesting the use of intelligence add to the common strategy 
of policing: arrest.  Therefore, if results tilt toward “always” then this would be a strong driver to 
the adoption of ILP. 
Several survey items are considered operational forces that restrain the acceptance of 
ILP.  The primary reason these items are considered restraining forces is because they require 
extra or special effort on the part of an agency.  Extra effort is considered a burden for an agency 
and is assumed to fall on the “restraining” side of a Force Field analysis.  The item “Does your 
agency have defined goals and objectives for collecting, analyzing, producing and sharing 
information” is considered a restraining force because the lack of formal agency goals in this 
area would suggest the organization does not take ILP or analysis very seriously.  This disinterest 
may be viewed as support for the traditional police culture.  Thus, if the mean score tilts toward 
“no,” this could be a weak restraining force.  The item “Do you audit your intelligence function 
and records?” is a restraining force because an audit will take effort and may be seen as a burden 
of an ILP program.  Thus, a mean score tilting toward “no” would indicate that this is a strong 
restraining force in the acceptance of ILP.  A final restraining force was measured in the item 
“Do you have a policy designed expressly to guide your intelligence function.”  This is a 
restraining force because a formal written policy is time consuming and requires substantial 
effort on the part of the chief and agency.  Thus, an agency may start an ILP component without 
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taking the effort to formally institutionalize the program.  Therefore, a score that tilts toward 
“no” would indicate this is a strong restraining force from an operational perspective.  
 
 
Findings 
Determining if a force is strong or weak, thus identifying which forces can be exploited, 
minimized, or ignored, is subjective; while the driving and restraining forces are measured in a 
quantitative fashion, a reasonable level of “strength” or “weakness” must be classified in the 
same way a level of statistical significance is set.  For this study, Table 2 labels the classification 
scores.  It is important to note that a resulting score is not automatically strong or weak, but 
rather scores must be interpreted based on whether the item was a driving or restraining force.  
For example, the item “All analysts (or personnel responsible for the intelligence function) in 
your agency are required to receive specific training on intelligence-led policing” received a 
fairly low score of 0.18 on a 0 – 1 scale.  This item was originally identified as a restraining force 
because the effort needed to develop a training program may be a burden on an agency.  It would 
be easier for a police department to simply enact an intelligence-led policing program and let it 
run its course.  A higher score would indicate the agency is placing effort on training, thus it 
would be a weak restraining force in the effort to move police agencies to accept intelligence-led 
policing.  In this case, however, the lower score suggest a stronger restraining force. 
 
[ Table 2 approximately here ] 
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With respect to the driving forces in the conceptual model (Figure 1), only one of the 
driving forces appears to be somewhat strong.  Respondents who are familiar with the concept of 
intelligence-led policing (µ =2.76) may serve as a beneficial or productive driving force.  They 
are already acquainted with components of intelligence-led policing and how it may fit within a 
police agency.  This can be very beneficial as a driving force because the workers within an 
organization, particularly those most familiar with a new program, can serve as “change agents” 
in the implementation of that program (Toch, 2008).  The driving force “The chief executive of 
your agency supports intelligence-led policing” is mostly neutral (µ = 2.73), and this misses an 
important component of leadership as it relates to worker behavior.  Specifically, supervisor 
officers and police administrators model the attitude and behavior for subordinate officers (Ferraro, 
1989; Jones, Moulton, and Reynolds, 2010).   The remaining driving forces are either mostly 
neutral (respondents are familiar with the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan) or 
somewhat weak (“most personnel [beyond analysts] in my agency are familiar with the 
intelligence-led policing concept”).   
 
[ Figure 1 approximately here ] 
 
The right side of Figure 1 shows the restraining forces of the conceptual model.  Three of 
the items – our agency has an intelligence capacity mission statement, all analysts are required to 
receive specific training in intelligence-led policing, and legal counsel has reviewed and 
approved all policies and procedures of the intelligence capacity – received fairly low scores, 
indicating potentially strong resisters.   The item “information sharing is one of the priorities of 
our agency” received a neutral score from the respondents.  Police agencies interested in moving 
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toward an intelligence-led policing strategy will want to focus energy on reducing these 
restraining forces.   
Figure 2 shows the force field model for operational items related to intelligence-led 
policing.  The fact that agencies appear to use open-sources for analysis is a strong driving force.  
This may suggest that police agencies are not reliant on formal or official sources in order to 
conduct analysis.  Further, responses indicate that most agencies have a suspicious activity 
reporting policy.  Between the use of open sources and formal “in-house” sources, the police 
agencies in this study appear to utilize available information sources, and are not necessarily 
waiting for after-the-fact crime reports to conduct analysis.  These driving forces, open sources 
and in-house sources, are relatively easy to utilize, and should be exploited to move an agency 
toward accepting intelligence-led policing. 
Most of the other items received lower or neutral scores, indicating they would be fairly 
weak as driving forces toward the acceptance of intelligence-led policing in police agencies.  
Several of these items warrant attention.  First, respondents indicated they do not have sufficient 
staff to achieve an intelligence mission.  This is an important driving force because it would 
demonstrate commitment by the agency to an intelligence-led policing strategy; however, hiring 
analysts (or shifting sworn officers into these positions) can expend inadequate agency resources, 
and attempts to increase this weak driving force may be limited.  Second, using intelligence in 
the agencies decision-making process received a neutral score.  Given that the primary goal of an 
intelligence process is to provide information to decision makers (Lowenthal, 2012), its absence 
in the decision-making process could be interpreted by sworn and non-sworn personnel in a way 
that amplifies the weakness of this driver.  Analysis and analytic products could be seen as a 
“make-work” policy.  Third, and somewhat related to the use of analysis in decision-making, 
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results show that intelligence does not frequently contribute to arrests.  This finding should be 
interpreted with caution.  Analysis is a component of many policing initiatives, including the 
“SARA” process in problem-solving, CompStat, evidence-based policing, and the smart policing 
initiative of the U.S. Department of Justice (Phillips, 2012).  As such, the use of analysis and 
intelligence should contribute to a reduction in crime and disorder, but this would not necessarily 
contribute to an increase in arrests.  Still, many studies of intelligence-led policing use “increases 
in the number of arrest” as a measure of effectiveness (Maguire, 2000, p. 330).   
 
[ Figure 2 approximately here ] 
 
The right side of Figure 2 shows the restraining forces of the operational model.  Most of 
the items revolve around the issue of “formality” of intelligence-led policing, and the low scores 
indicate the potential for strong restraining forces.  Specifically, respondents indicated their 
agencies did not have a policy to expressly guide the intelligence function.  Also, there were no 
defined goals for collecting, analyzing, production, or sharing information.  Finally, there was a 
low score for agencies having an intelligence capacity mission statement.  These items point to a 
lack of support by agency administrators.  Top-level police supervisors are responsible for 
providing guidance and direction to the agency, thus illustrating to the officers and the public 
what is important to the agency.  This also allows the internal and external environment to decide 
if the agency is reaching its goals (Stojkovic et al., 2008).  If there is a lack of formal guidance 
by the administration in the area of intelligence-led policing then officers and the public will 
likely interpret this as an indication that intelligence-led policing is unimportant.  A final 
restraining force, “Does agency receive information from outside agencies?” received a fairly 
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high score, indicating that agencies do work with other agencies in their intelligence-led policing 
process.  A collaborative effort with the external environment can illustrate agency actors that 
the policy is serious, particularly in secretive policing environment.   
Lastly, restraining and driving forces for both the conceptual and operational models 
were explored with agency size.  As agency size has been found to be positively associated with 
law enforcement’s change towards homeland security (Schafer et al., 2009; Giblin, Schafer and 
Burruss, 2009), it seems reasonable to assume such a relationship might exist with respect to 
intelligence-led policing.  Further along this school of thought is that large agencies – especially 
those which are major urban areas (e.g., New York, Washington, DC, Chicago, etc.) – are more 
likely to feel the need to adopt an intelligence-led approach as compared to a small rural 
department.  However, as posited within the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (which 
is published by the U.S. Department of Justice and intended to be the guidelines by which state 
and local agencies develop intelligence-led policing), all agencies regardless of size (emphasis 
added) must adopt an intelligence capability.   
Through the exploration of agency size and the factors identified in this study, it was 
found that agency size was not correlated with any of the restraining or driving forces (analysis 
not shown).  Moreover, when agency size was simplified into “large” (100 or more sworn 
officers) and “small” (10 or less sworn officers) agencies consistent with Schafer and his 
colleagues’ (2009) approach, there were no statistical differences in the means when utilizing an 
independent t-test between these two groups (analysis not shown).  It is reasonable to assume 
that if differences did exist with respect to change towards intelligence-led policing, it would 
exist between these two categories of agencies.  This finding is promising as all agencies, 
32 
 
 
 
regardless of size, are charged with the responsibility to develop an intelligence capability to 
effectively share information.  It appears this may be the case, albeit at a very basic level.   
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The current study sought to explore conceptual and operational characteristics of police 
organizations as they shift towards an intelligence-led policing philosophy.  Despite the data 
limitations outlined within the methodology section, the responses that comprise the present 
study are thought to be the most valid from the available population of key personnel.  
Identifying people who work in the expanding arena of law enforcement intelligence in diverse 
law enforcement agencies is a difficult sampling frame to capture.  Also, and though it is not 
believed to be the case, given respondents’ investment in intelligence-related work within their 
organization, their ability to make objective determinations with respect to the organization’s 
progress on these issues is worth noting.  Despite these concerns, the data utilized for this study 
are currently some of the best available for exploring intelligence-led policing at the national 
level within the United States as it is derived from a NIJ-funded national assessment specifically 
targeting intelligence practice among state and local law enforcement using a survey instrument 
vetted by police professionals working within their agencies’ intelligence unit.  Empirical 
research to date exploring the extent to which state and local agencies are engaged in 
intelligence-led policing (as conceptualized post-9/11) has resulted from secondary data analysis 
in the U.S. (Schaible and Sheffield, 2012) and two studies with original data collection in New 
Zealand (Darroch and Mazerolle, 2013; Ratcliffe, 2005).   
 Determinations, albeit somewhat subjective, made to categories means of binary 
variables (as shown in Table 2) into “weak”, “neutral”, and “strong” were done to create 
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discernible differences among responding agencies.  Future research may build on these 
measures to improve the range and measurement sensitivity to more accurately reflect an 
organization’s position.  Survey results indicate driving and restraining forces that may be 
enhanced or maximized, others that need to be minimized, and still other forces that may 
currently be ignored.  Several of the weak or neutral driving forces, as well as strong restraining 
forces, appear to be aspects of organizational leadership.  Consistent with previous findings on 
organizational  commitment and police change (Ford et al., 2003; Morabito, 2010; Yates and 
Pillai, 1996), a chief executive needs to increase the support for intelligence-led policing, 
articulate their support in an agency mission statement, and enact policies that demonstrate a 
commitment to the intelligence-led policing function in an agency.  This could be done with 
clear guidelines and goals for collecting, analyzing, and producing intelligence reports.   
Further, intelligence-led policing products should be integrated into agency decision-
making (Ratcliffe and Guidetti, 2008).  For example, an analytic product related to a crime-
specific problem should contribute to the development of a targeted approach to deal with the 
problem.  Or, a large-scale intelligence-led policing report may help inform the decision to enact 
a new policy on training.  It should be noted that this weak driving force may be one of the easier 
forces to adjust.  Agency leaders should make extra effort to either utilize intelligence products 
in their decision-making, or they should clearly explain their rationale for making a decision that 
discounts the intelligence.  Similar to the CompStat strategy, agencies can seek to establish 
regularly scheduled intelligence meetings to discuss existing intelligence cases, the flow of 
information within the agency and external with other agencies, and also the dedication of 
necessary resources to further improve the intelligence function.  Regardless of whether 
intelligence-led policing products are used in the decision-making process or not, agency 
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administrators should be transparent when it comes to application of the intelligence-led policing 
products.   
 Several of the weaker driving forces, or stronger restraining forces, were related to 
administrative support for intelligence-led policing, and it could be argued that they are relatively 
easy to change.  A police chief can demonstrate support for intelligence-led policing through 
formal and informal communications with subordinates.  A new policy dealing specifically with 
intelligence collection, analysis, and production, while not necessarily an easy administrative 
task to construct, can show department personnel and the public that intelligence-led policing is 
important to the chief and the agency.  This can also occur with a mission statement that clearly 
includes the use of intelligence-led policing.  As was proven with community policing, clear 
support from the upper-levels of chain of command can increase the likelihood of success for 
ILP within the organization.  More specifically, commitment should come in the form of formal 
rewards based in performance evaluation and be voiced in the agency’s list of priorities.  
 The lack of sufficient personnel to conduct intelligence analysis, and the insufficient 
intelligence-led policing training, are driving and restraining forces, respectfully, that will likely 
be more difficult for a police agency to tackle.  Hiring additional agency personnel will be 
difficult, particularly in the current economic environment (Wiseman, 2011).  Also, police 
agencies will likely have to seek out training resources (Willis et al., 2007).  While many 
departments are reluctantly assigning intelligence responsibilities to existing staff (who are likely 
already overburdened), the lack of required intelligence-specific training is likely to undercut the 
movement towards adopting intelligence and analysis capabilities.  Rather straightforward is the 
necessity that intelligence and analysis, in order to be most effective, relies on specialized 
training (Carter, 2009).  A lack of training could result in poor intelligence products and thus 
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poorly informed decision making.  The difficulty with this impediment is the lack of available 
training specific to intelligence-led policing.  At the time of this research, there is currently not a 
single training program provided to law enforcement that specific targets the intelligence-led 
process (Carter, Carter, and Chermak, 2013).  The best law enforcement can currently hope for is 
for some of the basic ILP concepts to be touched upon within homeland security or counter-
terrorism programs – though such programs themselves are few and far between.   
More pertinent to adoption, regardless of the organizational reason as to why intelligence 
training is not required, it implies that training is not important, and thus may communicate to 
line personnel that intelligence-led policing is not important.  Therefore, minimizing this 
restraining force will require resources, and this is often one of the biggest problems for police 
agencies to access.  A clarification here is likely warranted as the sample population is agencies 
that attended an intelligence training program.  Though this may imply that an agency is 
dedicated to training on intelligence, this training program was provided by funding from the 
Department of Homeland Security and free of charge to the agencies which attended.  Moreover, 
there is a distinct difference between an agency sending personnel to a training program at no 
cost (beyond dedicating personnel for training for that day) and requiring personnel responsible 
for the intelligence function to receive intelligence-specific training.  Again as economic times 
continue to strain police agencies, it may be necessary for the federal government to make 
training (the funded training program which the survey population was drawn is no longer 
receiving funding at the time of this is written) and materials more accessible while also 
providing technical assistance programs similar to the initiatives of the Office of Community-
Oriented Policing Services did in the 1990s.   
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Respondent demographics  
 N (Valid Percent) 
Agency Size1 
          Small2 
          Medium3 
          Large4 
 
35 (13%) 
84 (31%) 
153 (56%) 
Agency Region 
          Northeast 
          Southeast 
          Midwest 
          Southwest 
          West 
 
60 (22%) 
62 (23%) 
73 (27%) 
30 (11%) 
47 (17%) 
Respondent’s Position 
          Administrator 
          Supervisor 
          Investigator 
          Analyst 
 
82 (30%) 
62 (23%) 
87 (32%) 
41 (15%) 
Respondent Years at Agency 
          Less than 1 Year 
          1-3 Years 
          4-9 Years 
          10-15 Years 
          More than 15 Years 
 
1 (.3%) 
16 (6%) 
49 (18%) 
57 (21%) 
149 (55%)  
1Mean = 276, Median = 1,341 
210 or less sworn officers 
311 – 99 sworn officers 
4100 or more sworn officers 
 
Table 2. Measurement of driving or restraining forces  
1 – 4 Ordinal Measures 
 1.00 – 1.74 Fairly weak / strong 
 1.75 – 2.24 Somewhat weak / strong 
 2.25 – 2.74  Mostly neutral  
 2.75 – 3.24  Somewhat strong / weak 
 3.25 – 4.00 Fairly strong / weak 
 
0 – 2 Ordinal Measures 
 0.0 – 0.75 Weak /strong 
 0.76 – 1.24 Mostly Neutral 
 1.25 – 2 Strong / weak 
 
0 – 1 Dichotomous Measures 
 0.0 – 0.4  Weak / strong 
 0.41 – 0.60  Neutral 
 0.61 – 1.0 Strong / weak 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: Force-Field Model (Conceptual Model) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Our agency has an intelligence capacity 
mission statement. (µ = .33)  
Current Condition: 
Traditional Reactive 
Policing 
Desired Condition: 
Adopting Intelligence-
Led Policing  
Driving Forces Restraining Forces 
How familiar are you with the 
National Criminal Intelligence 
Sharing Plan (NCISP)?  (µ = 2.61)  
All analysts (or personnel responsible for 
the intelligence function) in your agency 
are required to receive specific training on 
intelligence-led policing. (µ = .18) 
Information sharing is one of the priorities 
of our agency. (µ = 2.58)  
 
Legal counsel has reviewed and approved 
all policies and procedures of the 
intelligence capacity. (µ = .39)  
 
How familiar are you with the 
intelligence-led policing concept?  (µ 
=2.76) 
The chief executive of your agency 
supports intelligence-led policing. (µ 
= 2.73) 
Most of the intelligence analysts in 
my agency are familiar with the 
intelligence-led policing concept. (µ 
= 2.46) 
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Figure 2: Force-Field Model (Operational Model) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Most personnel (beyond analysts) in 
my agency are familiar with the 
intelligence-led policing concept (µ = 
2.07) 
Do you have a policy designed expressly to 
guide your intelligence function? (µ = 1.07) 
Current Condition: 
Traditional Reactive 
Policing 
Desired Condition: 
Adopting Intelligence-
Led Policing  
Driving Forces Restraining Forces 
Does your agency’s intelligence 
function follow the NCISP 
Recommendations? (µ = 2.23)  
Do you audit your intelligence function and 
records? (µ = .60)  
Does your agency have defined goals and 
objectives for collecting, analyzing, 
producing and sharing information? (µ = .41) 
 
Our agency has an intelligence capacity 
mission statement. (µ = .33) 
We have a sufficient number of staff 
to achieve our agency’s intelligence 
capacity mission. (µ = 2.03) 
 How often is intelligence formally 
integrated into your agency’s decision-
making process? (µ = 2.53) 
Does your agency have a specific 
“Suspicious Activity Reporting” (SAR) 
policy? (µ = .86) 
Is your Criminal Intelligence Records 
System 28 CFR Part 23 compliant? (µ = 
1.04) 
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How close is the working relationship 
between your organization and your 
State Fusion Center? (µ = 2.62) 
How frequently does intelligence from 
your agency contribute to arrests? (µ = 
1.92) 
Our agency uses information from 
open sources as part of the intelligence 
process. (µ = .74) 
Does agency receive information from 
outside agencies? (µ = 3.44) 
Our agency has processes in place for 
sharing relevant terrorism information 
with the public? (µ = .39) 
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Appendix A 
 
Survey Items and Coding 
Driving Forces 
 
How familiar are you with the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP)? 
Scale: (3) Very Familiar; (2) Somewhat Familiar; (1) Have Heard of It; (0) Have Not Heard of It 
 
How familiar are you with the Intelligence Led Policing concept? 
Scale:  (3) Very Familiar; (2) Somewhat Familiar; (1) Have Heard of It; (0) Have Not Heard of It 
 
The chief executive of your agency supports ILP 
Scale: (3) Strongly Agree, (2) Agree, (1) Disagree, (0) Strongly Disagree 
 
Most of the intelligence analysts in my agency are familiar with the ILP concept 
Scale:  (3) Strongly Agree, (2) Agree, (1) Disagree, (0) Strongly Disagree 
 
Most personnel (beyond analysts) in my agency are familiar with the ILP concept 
Scale:  (3) Strongly Agree, (2) Agree, (1) Disagree, (0) Strongly Disagree 
 
How frequently does intelligence from your agency contribute to arrests? 
Scale:  (3) Always, (2) Frequently, (1) Occasionally, (0) Rarely 
 
Our agency has processes in place for sharing relevant terrorism information with the public. 
Binary: (1) Yes, (0) No 
 
Does your agency’s intelligence function follow the NCISP Recommendations?  
Scale:  (3) Completely, (2) Mostly, (1) Some, (0) None 
 
We have a sufficient number of staff to achieve our agency’s intelligence capacity mission. 
Scale:  (3) Strongly Agree, (2) Agree, (1) Disagree, (0) Strongly Disagree 
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How often is intelligence formally integrated into your agency’s decision-making process? 
Scale: (3) All the time, (2) Sometimes, (1) Occasionally, (0) Never 
 
Does your agency have a specific “Suspicious Activity Reporting” (SAR) policy? 
Binary: (1) Yes, (0) No 
 
Is your Criminal Intelligence Records System 28 CFR Part 23 compliant? 
Scale:  (2) Yes, (1) It is being modified, (0) No, (0) Unknown 
 
How close is the working relationship between your organization and your State Fusion Center? 
Scale:  (3) Very Close, (2) Somewhat Close, (1) Distant, (0) We have No Relationship 
 
Our agency uses information from open sources as part of the intelligence process 
Binary: (1) Yes, (0) No 
 
Restraining Forces 
 
Our agency has an intelligence capacity mission statement. 
Binary: (1) Yes, (0) No 
 
All analysts (or personnel responsible for the intelligence function) in your agency are required 
to receive specific training on intelligence-led policing. 
Binary: (1) Yes, (0) No 
 
Information sharing is one of the priorities of our agency.   
Scale: (3) Strongly Agree, (2) Agree, (1) Disagree, (0) Strongly Disagree 
 
Legal counsel has reviewed and approved all policies and procedures of the intelligence capacity. 
Binary: (1) Yes, (0) No 
 
Do you have a policy designed expressly to guide your intelligence function? 
Scale: (2) Yes, (1) It is in development, (0) No, (0) Unknown 
 
Do you audit your intelligence function and records? 
Binary: (1) Yes, (0) No 
 
Does your agency have defined goals and objectives for collecting, analyzing, producing and 
sharing information? 
Binary: (1) Yes, (0) No 
 
How frequently does your agency receive the information from outside agencies?   
Scale:  (7) Daily, (6) Weekly, (5) Bi-Weekly, (4) Monthly, (3) Quarterly, (2) Bi-Annually, (1) 
Less than Annually, (0) Never  
 
